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CONSUMERS SWALLOW ANOTHER
LEMON: AGENCY CONSENT ORDER
PREEMPTION OF STATE
"LEMON LAW" STANDARDS FOR
INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1

GeneralMotors v. Abrams

I. INTRODUCrION

The doctrine of federal preemption continues to be a key battleground in the
development of the consumer movement and in ongoing struggles between
consumers and manufacturers. Whereas federal preemption once was used to
expedite progress in the implementation of remedial legislation, changes in the
balance of power at the federal level have created opportunities for manufacturers
to use their renewed influence in the executive branch (and through its appointments, in the regulatory agencies) as both a shield from more aggressive state
enforcement of consumer rights and a sword against consumer access to the
2

courts.

GeneralMotors v. Abrams represents one such effort. It also represents an
early battle in the struggle to maintain influence over the format and rules of
informal dispute resolution programs. Driven in part by crowded court dockets
and skyrocketing legal costs, policymakers at both the state 3 and federal 4 levels

increasingly encourage or require the use of such programs, where available,
before allowing recovery in the courts. In addition, GeneralMotors v. Abrams
raises important policy questions: what are the best methods for (1) conducting

1. 703 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
2. The author is a former lobbyist for a state consumer organization.
3. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988) (consumers must seek arbitration
before pursuing court action; manufacturers' programs must meet the FTC's minimum standards);
MINN. STAT. § 325F.665 (1988) (manufacturer may require consumer to participate in informal dispute
resolution before state court action); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon 1976
& Supp. 1985) (use of state informal dispute resolution program without prejudice to consumer; if
used, allows more beneficial posture regarding presumptions and remedies in later court action). The
general policy is to offset such a requirement with standards protecting the consumer which the
manufacturer's program must meet. This policy also animates Magnuson-Moss, infra note 4.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (1982) (manufacturers offering informal dispute resolution
mechanisms in written warranties which meet minimum standards may require consumer to use prior
to commencing civil action). See also supra note 3.
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and (2) regulating informal dispute resolution in the context of a nationwide
5
dispute between consumers and a large manufacturer?
This Note will first examine the background of GM v. Abrams, which
involves a successful attempt by General Motors (GM) to use a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) consent order to block the application of New York's "Lemon
Law" 6 to the arbitration program contained in the order.7 Second, it will discuss
the legal context of the dispute (chiefly the extension of the federal preemption
doctrine to "implicitly preemptive" agency consent orders). Third, it will outline
the court's application of that doctrine in the instant case. Finally, it will offer a
critical evaluation of both the legal and policy grounds of the decision, concluding
with suggestions for legislative action which would sharpen the resolution of the
issues involved, enhance the fairness and progress of informal dispute resolution,
and better protect the consumer.

II. BACKGROUND OF GM v. Abrams
In 1980, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a complaint against
General Motors (GM) for, inter alia,failing to notify consumers of serious defects
in the powertrain components of a large quantity of GM products in violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended. 8 The case was
settled by a consent order, approved by the FTC in 1983, 9 which required GM
to "implement a nationwide third-party arbitration program to settle complaints of
10
individual owners relating to powertrain components."
The FTC consent order referenced an arbitration program developed by
GM in conjunction with the Better Business Bureau (BBB). 1 1 This program
ordinarily employs lay arbitrators from the community and urges them to decide
cases based on "their own sense of fairness." 12 There is, however, some
language in the program manuals which indicates the arbitrations will be

5. General Motors is "the largest company in the world." GeneralMotors Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1741,
1744 (1983) (separate statement of Commissioner Pertschuk).
6. A "lemon law" is a law requiring manufacturers to offer refunds, repairs or replacements (in
some combination) for recently purchased motor vehicles which are deemed "defective" or beyond
repair. While "the vast majority" of states have adopted such laws, standards for classification as a
"lemon" and remedial schemes vary. Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of State Motor
Vehicle WarrantyLegislation (Lemon Laws), 51 A.L.R. 4th 872 (1987). See also infra note 102. The
instant court notes that, in essence, lemon laws create a statutory warranty. See Abrams, 703 F. Supp.
at 1104-05.
7. GeneralMotors, 102 F.T.C. at 1750-1803.
8. Id. at 1742-43.
9. Id. at 1749.
10. Id. at 1761.
11. Id. Specific modifications to this program were ordered in Attachment B. Id. at 1790.
12. Affidavit of Dean W. Determan at paragraph 8, cited in Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1110.
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conducted according to the law of the state in which they are held. 13 The order
intended to preempt state regulations which
did not specify whether or not it was
14
may be triggered by the program.
In 1986, New York amended its 1983 "Lemon Law" 15 to include a series
of new standards for informal dispute resolution programs offered by manufacturers to New York consumers. 16 Among these were provisions requiring: (1)
inclusion of all state "Lemon Law" remedies; 17 (2) arbitrators to be trained and
familiar with the terms of the New York Lemon Law; (3) consumers to be
permitted to make oral presentations; 18 (4) the arbitration system to comply with
federal law to the extent it applied; 19 (5) consumers to be supplied with a copy
of the Lemon Law "Bill of Rights" at the time of21the arbitration; 20 and (6) the
keeping of specified records by the manufacturer.
Abrams, the Attorney General of New York, sought to compel GM to comply
with the New York Lemon Law (including the 1986 amendments) in its
arbitrations of the complaints of New York consumers. 22 GM sought a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District

13. See, e.g., General Motors, 102 F.T.C. at 1771: "The law of the state where your dispute is
arbitrated shall apply." (quoting Attachment A of the order, entitled GeneralMotors Zone Handbook
for Third-PartyArbitration). The relevant subsection is labeled, "Arbitration: A National Program of
Dispute Resolution: National Program of Consumer Arbitration Through the Better Business Bureaus:
Uniform Rules for Better Business Bureau Arbitration." Paragraph three of that subsection, quoted
above, is entitled, "The state law." General Motors and the court argue that this language only applies
to strictly procedural rules and that the lemon law provisions are too substantive in nature to be
encompassed by this provision. See Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1112-13. But see infra note 68.
14. See GeneralMotors, 102 F.T.C. at 1750-1803. New York's statute regulates informal dispute
resolution programs when offered by manufacturers, but does not require manufacturers to offer such
programs. See infra note 16.
15. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988).
16. The listed amendments to follow formed the portion of the law challenged by GM as
preempted by the 1983 FTC Consent Order. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1105-06.
17. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(g), (m)(1)(iii) (McKinney 1988). The New York remedies
include the right to have a "lemon" (a car which is so defective that it "substantially impairs its value"
even after a reasonable number of repair attempts) replaced or the consumer awarded a full refund, at
the consumer's option. Id. A presumption of a "reasonable number" is defined in the statute as four
attempts to repair the same defect within the first eighteen thousand miles of operation or the first two
years, whichever comes first. Alternatively, a car out of repair for a cumulative total of 30 days during
that period qualifies as a "lemon." Id. at § 198-a(d).
18. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(m)(1)(i) (McKinney 1988).
19. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(m)(1)(ii) (McKinney 1988). This section, in essence, means
that programs offered by manufacturers must meet the Magnuson-Moss Act minimum standards, as
defined in the FTC's Rule 703 (1983). See 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1983). Far from presenting a conflict,
this amendment was adopted "consistent with the goal of minimizing differences in state and federal
compliance requirements." Givens (former FTC Regional Director), Practice Commentaries to §198-a
at 315 (1988).
20. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(m)(2) (McKinney 1988).
21. Id. §198-a(mX3), cited in Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1105.
22. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1106.
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Law preempted and unenforceable as the result
of New York to hold the Lemon
23
of the FTC Consent Order.
The issues in the case are: (1) Can a consent order issued by a federal
regulatory agency preempt a state statute? (2) If so, does this particular FTC
consent order preempt application of the 198624 amendments to the New York
Lemon Law to GM's arbitrations in this case?
Abrams argued that an FTC consent order can never preempt a state statute;
or, alternatively, that it could not do so in the instant case. 2 5 GM argued that
such consent orders can have preemptive force and that the instant order was of
that nature. 26 The FTC, through its general counsel, filed an amicus curiae brief
arguing that its consent orders sometimes preempt state law, but that this one did
not. 27 However, the Chairman of the FTC (Daniel Oliver) sent a separate
"statement" arguing that the instant order was preemptive. 28 (The court observes
29
that Chairman Oliver's statement was the equivalent of a dissent.)
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the FTC consent order preempted the New York Lemon Law in this case
because: (1) the order "occupied the field" in its regulatory impact; and (2) the
Lemon Law "creates an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
in the consent order." 30 GM was
federal purposes and objectives, as expressed
31
therefore awarded summary judgment.
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
The question of whether a state's specific standards for informal dispute
resolution programs offered by manufacturers can be triggered when such a
program 32is required by an FTC consent order, rests upon a Supremacy Clause
analysis.
Federal regulationsissued by administrative agencies under powers delegated
by Congress have long been held to have the same preemptive effect as federal

23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
Id,at 1113.
2 provides:
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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statutes.33 In Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation of the United States v.
Abrams 3 4, Judge Sand of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that FTC regulations promulgated under the Ma nusonMoss Act3 5 preempt certain portions of the New York Lemon Law.3 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has similarly held that FTC
regulations of informal dispute settlement mechanisms which are offered by
manufacturers as part of a written warranty "leave no room for state regulation." 37 Other courts, however, find room for state regulation in this context,
38
but only by holding that the regulations are not intended to be preemptive.
Similarly, there are federal cases which hold that the orders of federal
regulatory agencies preempt the orders of state regulatory bodies. 39 There are
also state intermediate court decisions which hold that FTC consent orders
preempt state statutes. 40 However, there apparently is no prior federal case
the question of whether a federal agency's consent order preempts
which reaches 41
a state statute.

33. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). See also Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982).
34. 697 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Note, A Sour Lemon? FederalPreemption of
Lemon Law Regulations of Informal Dispute Resolution: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'Association
v.Abrams, 1989 J. DIsP. RES. 199 (authored by David P. Hiatt).
35. Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 23012312 (1982).
36. Specifically, the court held the following sections preempted: N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198a(g) (minimum requirements for informal dispute resolution offered by manufacturers on a voluntary
basis before consumers are required to use them); § 198-a(h) (arbitrator's decision binding); and § 198a(m) (arbitrator training, recordkeeping, notice to consumer, compliance with otherwise optional
Magnuson-Moss FTC regulations required, oral hearing provision). See Note, supra note 34, at 223.
GM's program, however, did not qualify under the federal regulations since it was not offered as part
of a prior written warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1982).
37. Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1987). However, the Court noted the
consumer's recovery under the Virginia Lemon Law was not disturbed by its holding that Rule 703
prevented a consumer from challenging the bona fide nature of the private dispute settlement
mechanism through a state common law fraud action. Id. at 1277-78.
38. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n., 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)
(state procedure for informal dispute settlement at consumer's option may coexist with procedures
offered by manufacturers which comply with Magnuson-Moss). See also Auto Importers of Am., Inc.
v. Minnesota, 681 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Minn. 1988) (state law requiring manufacturers to offer informal
dispute settlement mechanisms).
39. See, e.g., New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 570 F. Supp. 1558, 1570
(D. Me. 1983) (FCC).
40. See State ex rel. Van de Camp v. Texaco, Inc., 193 Cal. 3d 8, 762 P.2d 385, 219 Cal. Rptr.
221, (1988) (antitrust).
41. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1107-08. The Attorney General observes:
There simply is no federal precedent for preempting a state law on the basis of any agency
consent order. Strictly speaking, that appears to be true. The parties do not cite, and the
Court has not found, a federal case giving preemptive effect to a federal agency's order over
Neither can the Attorney General point to a case, federal or state, holding
a state statute ....
that a consent order can never have that effect.
Attorney General's main brief at 9, General Motors v. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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The United States Supreme Court has never confronted this issue directly. In
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,4 2 the Court held that certain
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) orders did not preempt state
regulation. 43 In so doing, however, the Court observes, "[P]re-emption may
result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within
the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation."4 4 Since orders, rather than rulemakings, were at issue,4 46the orders of
federal agencies may presumably, in some cases, be preemptive.
The high Court notes that the ultimate question in preemption cases is
"whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."4 7
Congressional intent to preempt may be found either expressly or inferred from
the circumstances. 48 "Pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed;" 4 9 in fact,
courts should, wherever possible, interpret language to avoid conflicts. 50 Thus,
express preemption can51be found only where Congress "expresses a clear intent
to pre-empt state law."

42. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
43. In Louisiana PSC, however, there was explicit congressional exclusion of preemption in the
area at issue. Id. at 377.
44. Id. at 369. The Court cites Fidelity Federal,458 U.S. 141; and Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
45. However, the instant court acknowledges that, due to their "industry-wide scope," the orders
at issue in Louisiana PSC "may be more closely analogous to regulations than to the consent order at
bar." Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1107-08.
46. Although the state regulation preempted in Louisiana PSC is not a statute, the high court's
references to preemption of state "law" in this instance lends persuasive credence to the inference that
state statutes may be preempted by the orders of federal agencies. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 374.
47. Id. at 369.
48. Id. at 368-69.
49. California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987). Abrams notes that
this is particularly true in fields such as consumer protection and warranty law, which are traditionally
the province of states. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985); Auto
Importers of Am., Inc. v. Minnesota, 681 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (D. Minn. 1988). See also infra note
63.
50. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 370. This duty is heightened when dealing with the regulations
of agencies rather than statutes. As the Supreme Court noted in Hillsborough County:
We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations
than from the comprehensiveness of statutes. As a result of their specialized functions,
agencies normally deal with problems in far more detail than does Congress. To infer preemption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount
to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will be
exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be inconsistent with the federal-state balance
embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.
Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 717. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
51. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 368 (citing Jones, 430 U.S. 519). For the application of this
"clear intent" standard to a Lemon Law preemption dispute, see Chrysler Corp, 755 F.2d at 1205
(finding no clear intent and therefore no preemption).
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The Supreme Court's "clear intent" standard is the rule in any case of
preemption, express or implied, in which the area of regulation is one traditionally
occupied by the states. 52 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held that
a presumption exists "that state and local regulation of health and safety matters
53
can constitutionally coexist with federal regulation."
When express preemption is lacking, courts may infer preemption if: (1)
"there is outright or actual conflict," (e.g., it is "physically impossible" to comply
with both federal and state law;) 54 (2) federal law contains an implicit barrier
to state regulation; 55 (3) Congress has legislated so comprehensively as to
"occupy an entire field of regulation" and leave "no room for the states to
supplement federal law;" 56 or (4) "where the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress." 5 7
Most recent cases collapse the second test into the remaining three.5 8 As
will be noted below, a combination of tests 1 and 3 (test 1(b) below) plus test 4
(test 2 below) form the basis of the Court's holding in the instant case.
IV. THE COURT'S RULING

The judge in the instant case first notes that the authority for the consent order
is not being challenged. 59 There is, he concludes, no essential difference
between agency rulemaking and agency orders for the purposes of a Supremacfy
a purpose. 6V
Clause analysis; nor does either differ from federal statutes for6such
1
Thus, a traditional Supremacy Clause analysis is appropriate.
Under such an analysis, preemption turns on the intent of Congress.
Preemption is not to be lightly presumed, particularly in areas traditionally within

52. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715-16 (note particularly the reference to "implicit" preemption at 716); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
53. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 716 (national blood policy not preemptive of local
regulations).
54. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132 (1963), cited in LouisianaPSC, 476 U.S. at 368.
55. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), cited in Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 368.
56. LouisianaPSC, 476 U.S. at 368 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. 318).
57. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), cited in LouisianaPSC, 476 U.S. at 369.
58. See Auto Importers,681 F. Supp. at 1377 (citing Fidelity,458 U.S. at 153); Guerra,479 U.S.
272; Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984). Fidelity was
decided in 1982, Guerra in 1987.
59. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1107-08.
60. Id. at 1108. This assumes, of course, that the agency's actions are within the authority
delegated by the Congress, which is not challenged by Abrams in this case. See supra note 60. Note
the court's failure to recognize the greater presumption against preemption in cases involving agency
action. See supra note 51.
61. Id. at 1109.
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the authority of the states (such as consumer protection and warranty).6 2
Preemption may be either expressed or implied
in the statute.6 3 In this case, the
64
implied.
is
issue is whether preemption
An inference of implied preemption is appropriate when Congress: (1)
"occupies the field" in the area of regulation, either (a) totally or (b) partially but
in such a way that compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
"physical impossibility"; and/or (2) "when state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con65
gress."
In General Motors v. Abrams the judge held that test l(b)--actual conflict
resulting in physical impossibility60--requires an inference of preemption because
there is a direct conflict between the standards for training and decision-making
set forth for arbitrators under the program adopted by GM pursuant to the consent
order and those required by the New York Lemon Law. Specifically, GM (and
the consent order) chose to adopt (with modifications) the program of the Better
Business Bureau (BBB), which requires no formal training of arbitrators and
employs a "common sense" method of decision-making without reference to actual
law.67 New York, on the other hand, requires judge-like training for arbitrators
and rulings based on formal law. 68
The order thus "occupies the field,"
according to the judge, and preemption is to be inferred.6 9

62. Id. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281. See also supra note 50. "Congress legislated here in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied (citations omitted). So we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
63. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1109.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1109-10 (citing Fidelity Federal,458 U.S. at 153; and Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). Note the
collapsing and remixing of the Louisiana PSC criteria. See supra notes 55-59.
66. This test is a combination of tests 1 and 3 of Louisiana PSC.
67. However, attachments ordered by the FTC to the consent order of arbitration program
materials prepared by GM and the BBB specify in three different places that state law will apply.
Attachment A (The Zone Handbook for Third-PartyArbitration), 102 F.T.C. at 1771, unequivocally
explains: "The law of the state where your dispute is arbitrated shall apply.' The same attachment
at 1774 notes: "The Arbitrator may make any decision which the Arbitrator deems to be fair and
equitable within the scope of your agreement to arbitrate, provided state law does not prohibit all or
part of that decision." (emphasis added). Attachment C (GeneralMotors Consumer Arbitration
Program)at 1797 enumerates among "[t]he
basic principles of BBB arbitration" that it is "[clonsistent
with state law." The court rationalizes away the latter two statements in Abrams based on an affidavit
of a former General Counsel (Determan) who helped design the program. Abrams, 703 F. Supp at
1112-13.
68. In essence, the judge objects to making the "specific standards for liability and relief" contained in the original New York Lemon Law binding upon arbitrators under the 1986 amendments.
Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1111. He does not want an arbitrator who finds that a repair has been
unsuccessfully attempted four times for a single defect within the first eighteen thousand miles or two
years of ownership (or that a car has been out of commission for a total of 30 days during that period)
to have to award a refund or replacement at the consumer's option. Id.
69. Id. at 1111.
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Test 2--obstacle to Congressional objectives--also requires an inference of
preemption, according to the judge. Both the intent of Congress to facilitate the
resolution of disputes through consent orders70 and the intent of Congress and
its agent (the FTC) to facilitate the adoption of informal dispute settlement
mechanisms are frustrated by New York's additional procedures and requirements. 71 In addition, the judge finds an essential feature of the FTC order (and
thus an objective of Congress' duly authorized agent) to be a program of
nationwide uniformity. This, he contends, is frustrated by allowing the application
of state laws. 72 Thus, the Court holds that application of the New73York statute
is implicitly preempted and GM is entitled to summary judgment.
V. CRITICAL EVALUATION

GeneralMotors v. Abrams is decided incorrectly. The court fails to properly
apply the Supreme Court's "clear intent" standard. The court confuses the
interests and policies of GM and the BBB with those of Congress and the FTC.
Moreover, the decision is, from a public policy standpoint, a real "lemon" to
consumers, to democracy, and to the advancement of alternative dispute resolution
techniques.
A. The Legal Issues
The court clearly fails to apply the "clear intent" standard 74 to its analysis
of the guidance offered by Congress and the FTC in this case. Heightened
scrutiny in the form of a strong presumption against preemption is appropriate
because: (1) the conflict is precipitated by the action of an agency, not a
statute; 75 (2) the conflict lies within areas traditionally within the domain of the
states (e.g., consumer protection, warranty, safety); 76 and (3) the inference drawn
is a negative one (based upon the absence of language one way or another). In

70. This intent and authority is found in the original FTC Act of 1914. See id. at 1104. See also
infra note 119.
71. Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
72. This contention is dubious. First, it is difficult to see how a program which allows each
individual arbitrator to apply his own standards of decision-making--or no standards--will facilitate
uniformity. It is more likely to do the opposite. See GeneralMotors, 102 F.T.C. at 1743-44 (separate
statement of Commissioner Pertschuk). Second, the program in question included a specific subsection
providing for the use of state law, yet listed it under a section labeled, "A NationalProgram of Dispute
Resolution: Uniform Rules for Better Business Bureau Arbitration." Id. at 1771 (emphasis added).
Third, the FTC denied that the program was designed to preempt state law in its amicus brief, as noted
supra, Section II.
73. Abrams, 703 F. Supp at 1115.
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 51.
76. See supra notes 50 and 63.
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such a case, the Supreme Court "will seldom infer" an intent to preempt, reasoning
so."
that if Congress or the agency had meant to preempt, they would have said
These factors distinguish the instant case from the precedents cited to support
it, in which the agency invariably expressed an intention to preempt and the issue
was merely whether it had a right to do so under authority delegated by
Moreover, in the present case, it seems clear that the FTC not only
Congress.
preempt; it intended not to preempt, 79 as its amicus brief
did not intend to
80
states.
explicitly
It seems equally clear that Congress would not agree with the court's
inference of its intent. As in Louisiana PSC,8 1 Congress expressly contemplated
82
a dual system of regulation. Throughout the Magnuson-Moss Act, Congress
set "minimum" (not "exclusive" or "maximum") standards for industry compliance. 83 The court in Auto Importers84 emphasizes the suggestion in section

77. Thus, in Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 718, the Supreme Court notes:
[B]ecause agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak
through a variety of means, including regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and
responses to comments, we can expect that they will make their intentions clear if they
intend for their regulations to be exclusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to the
question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity
of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to pre-empt. Given the
presumption that state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can
normally coexist with federal regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health
and safety.
Id.
Although the issue in the instant case is an agency consent order, the FTC had ample opportunity
(three years) to raise and dispose of the issue in its order; in the statements of commissioners attached
to the order; in the notice published in the FederalRegister; etc. See GeneralMotors, 102 F.T.C. at
1741.
78. See, e.g., Auto Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1379 n.8 (noting Fidelity's basis in language designating the area to be governed "exclusively by federal law"); New England Tel. & Tel., 570 F. Supp.
at 1559.
79. Intent of the agency not to preempt was a critical factor in a finding of no preemption by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 716 (FDA).
80. See supra note 28. But cf supra note 29 (chairman dissents). Thus, the FTC noted in reference to a similar case:
Magnuson-Moss makes it clear that the preservation of consumer rights and remedies under
state law is paramount: it not only sets no limitation on the savings clause for state-created
rights and remedies, but it expressly subordinates the preemption provision to the savings
clause. Also, the legislative history of the federal law shows that Congress anticipated
additional state legislation even in areas where Congress had acted.
Auto Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1378 n.5. See also infra note 91.
81. 476 U.S. 355.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982).
83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2310(aX2) (1982) (directing the FTC to "prescribe rules setting forth
minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure ....") (emphasis added). See also
15 U.S.C. § 2304 ('Federal Minimum Standards for Warranties"). See also supra note 81 and infra
note 90.
84. 681 F. Supp. at 1380 & n.ll.
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2310(a), which regulates informal dispute settlement mechanisms, that Congress
"envisioned such [state] enhancements [of consumer protection] insofar as it
directed the FTC to 'prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any
informal dispute settlement procedure....85
The general policy intent of Congress not to preempt state (or other federal)
remedies for the ills Magnuson-Moss is designed to address is evident from the
savings clause: "Nothing in this chapter shall invalidate or restrict any right or
remedy of any consumer under state law or any other federal law." 8 6 Specific
exceptions to this principle are listed in a later subsection. 87 Noticeably absent
from this subsection is the section covering informal dispute resolution. 88 The
FIC has issued an interpretation of the act clearly delineating the intention of
Congress to subordinate its limited preemptive objectives to those of the general
89
savings clause.
Thus, other courts which have fully explored the legislative and administrative
history of Magnuson-Moss have found no intention by Congress to "occupy the
field;" nor have they found an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
90
the full objectives of Congress."
The policies that the instant court finds infringed relate to: (1) the settlement
of cases through consent orders; (2) the right of the manufacturer to be free from
a patchwork of state requirements; and (3) the superiority of the arbitration
91
methodology devised by GM and the BBB to that of New York's Lemon Law.

85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1982).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c)(1) (1982). Even these limited exceptions may be overridden upon
application and showing by a state agency that state regulations: (1) better protect consumers; and (2)
do not unduly burden interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c)(2).
88. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c)(1) with § 2310(a). See also supra notes 81 and 84. See also
infra note 90.
89. As cited by the court in Auto Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1379 n.6, the FTC writes:
In general, the protections of the Warranty Act are in addition to, rather than in lieu
of, warranty rights and remedies under State law. Only a very narrow class of State
requirements are "preempted". . . . [Wlhile allowing the use of uniform warranty
documents is a goal of [the preemption clause], this goal is subordinate to that of
permitting States to fashion their own scheme o[f] warranty rights and remedies which
may be more protective than the minimum level of protection of the Federal Act...
. Thus, a State provision which merely creates consumer rights or remedies, without
providing for disclosure of them, would be entirely unaffected by the Warranty Act;
that is, it would not be subject to "preemption."
43 Fed. Reg. 50,737-38 (Oct. 31, 1978) (footnotes omitted). A similar view is clearly intended for the
rest of the statute. See supra note 81.
90. See, e.g., Chrysler v. Texas, 755 F. 2d at 1205-06; Chrysler Corp. v. Armstrong, No. 83-45,
slip op. at 1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 1985) (state oral hearing requirement in informal dispute settlement
not preempted), cited in Auto Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1378; Auto Importers at 1378-80.
91. The first policy is attributed to Congress under the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act. The
second is attributed to Congress through an implicit analysis that the manufacturer's interests must have
been included in the "balance" necessary to pass the legislation. This is more explicit in Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n, 697 F. Supp. at 736, which the court cites with approval, at 1107 n.1 & 1111-12. The
third policy is a mixture of the court's own policy analysis and negative inferences drawn from the
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In each instance, the court focuses on the perspective of manufacturers, either
emphasizing rights under an implicit balance of interests ostensibly contemplated
by the statute 9 (and the consent order itself) or the need to preserve incentives
for their cooperation as a practical necessity to obtain the benefits of the statutory
scheme .93
The legislative history, however, reflects an "overriding intent" to "enhance
consumer protections."94 The notion "that a significant congressional purpose
behind Magnuson-Moss was to convey rights to manufacturers is unsupported."9 5 Thus, the U.S. District Court for Minnesota upheld an even stronger
statute, mandating informal dispute resolution by manufacturers, noting that it
"seeks to further the Congressional goal of protecting consumers by enhancing the
96
protections established by Magnuson-Moss."
While consumer interests may arguably be enhanced by creating incentives
for manufacturers to offer informal dispute settlement mechanisms as part of a
written warranty (as in section 2310),97 the instant case did not involve such a
mechanism. 98 GM offered the program in dispute only after being cited with
an FTC complaint. 99 The relief was not part of any written warranty--rather, it
was a creation of the consent order. 100 Thus, not only is the policy of section
2310 not favored by the instant court's ruling, it is eroded by allowing the
to create
manufacturer to derive post hoc protection when the statute was designed101
incentives to offer such programs for the consumer's benefit up front.

FTC's action as Congress' agent.
92. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 697 F. Supp. at 736.
93. See 703 F. Supp. at 1111-13.
94. Auto Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1380.
95. Id. at 1380 & n.10. Thus, the House Report on the legislation notes: "The purpose of this
legislation is (1) to make warranties on consumer products more readily understood and enforceable,
(2) to provide the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with means of better protecting consumers, and
(3) to authorize appropriations for the operations of the FTC. ..." H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, cited in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7702.
96. Auto Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1380.

97. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1982).
98. The FTC has regulations establishing minimum requirements for informal dispute settlement
programs when voluntarily implemented as part of a manufacturer's written warranty under the
Magnuson-Moss Act. See Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1983). The
statutory language authorizing these regulations, however, only applies to programs initiated as part
of a written warranty prior to the sale of the product. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2)-(a)(3) with §
2302(a)(8) and (b)(1)(A).
99. GM may have had an arbitration program prior to the order. However, it apparently did not
meet the Magnuson-Moss minimum standards. Commissioner Douglas of the FTC noted in his
separate statement supporting the consent order that 48% of the more than 20,000 complaints filed with
the BBB would not have been entitled to arbitration prior to the order, although they were apparently
so entitled after the order. GeneralMotors, 102 F.T.C. at 1746.
100. See Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1104-05.
101. See supra notes 99 and 100. Note consumers waited three years from the filing of the
complaint to the entry of the consent order. (Presumably additional years were required to advance
from discovery of the defect to the filing of the complaint.) Then each had to go through arbitration
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The court's remaining policy concerns stem from congressional and agency
desire to create and preserve incentives for consent orders 10 2 and the desire to
avoid subjecting consent defendants to a patchwork of state procedures and
remedies.1° 3 Both beg the question of what was actually contained in the
consent order at issue. If the manufacturer entered into a consent order which was
not preemptive, as the FTC argues, 10 4 these policies are not directly implicated.l 05 Indeed, there is persuasive evidence that there is no conflict between the
GM/BBB procedures referenced in the consent order and state law. The manuals
for arbitrators included as attachments in the consent order indicates in three
different places that the procedures and rules of decision-making were subject to
state law. 1 06 Thus, compliance with both the order (which incorporated rules
containing this caveat) and the state law would not appear to be a physical
impossibility. Thus, none of the bases for implied preemption--federal occupation
of the field, obstacle to the congressional scheme, or simultaneous compliance
physically impossible 10 7-- is present. The "clear intent" standard is not met; the
available evidence of congressional intent cuts against preemption.
The court's final concern--the flexibility, efficiency, and equity of lay
arbitrators operating under a decision-making rule limited to their own concepts
of fairness1 8_becomes merely a policy issue.

before getting satisfaction or starting all over again in the courts. This runs directly counter to the key
perceived benefit of informal dispute resolution: quicker settlements for consumers (a particularly
urgent consideration when the family automobile is involved!).
102. As noted above, supra note 71, authority for the FTC to enter into consent orders was
provided in the 1914 FTC Act, not the Magnuson-Moss Act. Thus, it may be argued that the
congressional intent underlying the 1914 Act is the most relevant. However, Magnuson-Moss was
entitled, in part, "the FTC Improvement Act." As such, it represents an expression of more
contemporary congressional intent on issues surrounding that agency. Moreover, it contains specific
provisions regarding informal dispute resolution and announces a congressional policy in that area.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (1982). Hence, its policies are entitled to substantial weight.
103. But uniformity would seem to be undermined by the "standardless" method of decisionmaking based on each individual arbitrator's sense of fairness this case requires. See GeneralMotors,
102 F.T.C. at 1744 (separate statement of Commissioner Pertschuk). The result is to subject consumer
plaintiffs to an even greater "patchwork" of modes of decision-making and results. See infra note 117.
104. See supra notes 28, 81, & 90. But cf. supra note 29 (chairman disagrees).
105. While GM may have entered into the consent order in the mistaken belief that the order was
preemptive, ignorance of the law is no excuse. GM is chargeable with knowledge of the law and is
sophisticated enough to have known that it needed to get preemption language spelled out in the order
if that was a key bargaining point.
106. See supra note 68. See also supra notes 14 & 73. Since the federal order merely
incorporates the BBB rules, which themselves defer to state law (as they would in any arbitration
conducted in New York by GM without a consent order), there would seem to be no preemption. The
FTC agrees with this view. But compare Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1112-13.
107. See supra notes 55-59.
108. SeeAbrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1111-13.
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B. The Policy Issues

Under such an analysis, from a policy perspective, the court places the
interests of GM and the policies of its private arbitration program (developed in
conjunction with the BBB) above the interests and policies of New York,
Congress, the FTC, and consumers.
The interests of states 10 9 and of the federal government in creating an
effective, dual system of regulation to protect consumers from automotive
"lemons" is not insubstantial. It has been estimated that automobile manufacturers
produce "more than 10,000 lemons per year."' 110 Beyond its derogation of
consumer interests, the decision offends process values. In essence, a single
unelected federal judge has allowed the opinions and concerns of a single member
of an unelected regulatory agency (Chairman Oliver) to override the will of the
people's elected representatives at both the state and federal level.1 11
While other courts may look at the true intent of Congress and the FTC and
find ample grounds to reverse the holding of this case, the steady trend of the last
decade of federal regulatory agencies once again becoming captives of the
case 113
industries they regulate112 suggests that the pattern at work in this
may recur repeatedly. Moreover, by allowing the procedural deck to be stacked,
the court's holding cuts directly at the viability of using alternative dispute
resolution techniques to settle manufacturer-consumer conflicts. Thus, the surest
remedy for consumers and the process interests offended in this decision lies in
pressure on Congress.
Congressional action might take the form of legislation explicitly declaring
that such consent orders are not preemptive; or that they are preemptive only when
the agency expressly includes such language in its order. Another measure worthy
of consideration is federal legislation requiring informal dispute settlement
mechanisms to contain consumer safeguards at least as strong as those contained

109. "[T]he vast majority of states have enacted" lemon laws. Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Effect ofState Motor Vehicle Warranty Legislation (Lemon Laws), 51 A.L.R.4th 872, 877 (1987).
110. "It is estimated that over one-half of the domestic and over one-third of the foreign automobiles sold in 1981 contained defects at the time they were delivered to consumers, and of these defective
vehicles, 34 percent suffered recurring problems.' Id. at 875. See also, Note, Lemon Laws: Putting
the Squeeze on Automobile Manufacturers, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1125 (1984).
111. The Supreme Court in Louisiana PSC expressed concern with granting an agency "power to
override Congress." 476 U.S. at 374-75. Here the court defers to a single member of an agency against the agency itself, as well as Congress and the state legislature of New York.
112. This factor defeats the policy at work in permitting such settlements, which assumes that the
regulatory agency represents consumers. In essence, the consumer is forced to delegate his fate to an
agent whose sympathies lie with his adversary. This is starkly evident in the instant case, in which
"over 70%" of the hundreds of consumers who commented to the FTC opposed the arbitration agreement, while only 14% supported it. See General Motors, 102 F.T.C. at 1743 (separate statement of
Commissioner Pertschuk).
113. That is: an industry gets a favorable ruling from a sympathetic agency to preempt the action
of states more interested in protecting consumer rights.
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in New York's Lemon Law. 1 14 A national debate on the latter alternative
relative merits of
would have the added virtue of flushing out evidence on the
115
different forms and forums for informal dispute resolution.
Only through action by elected representatives can the "balance of interests" 116 which the instant court sees as the objective of the MagnusonMoss1 17 and F'TC 118 Acts be restored. Until then, consumers may wonder
whether decisions such as GeneralMotors v. Abrams herald a return to the days
when public policymakers unabashedly proclaimed, "What's good for General
Motors is good for the country!" 119
GREGORY L. BARNES

114. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988).
115. Note the court in this case seems to believe the flexibility, efficiency, and equity of the
GM/BBB scheme are preferable to those of New York's Lemon Law. See Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at
1111-13. However, it cites no evidence to support this view.
It may be argued with equal or greater conviction (as it was successfully by elected representatives in the New York legislature) that the qualities of professionalism (via training), consistency (via
the use of actual law), and equity (use of laws created by majority will rather than the gut instinct of
a single volunteer from the community) present in the New York scheme are superior.
Thus, a letter to the FTC signed by 29 state attorneys general noted that under the scheme
adopted by the court, "similarly situated consumers could get a whole loaf, half a loaf or no loaf at all.
Arbitrary arbitrations are not the answer to resolving this case." General Motors, 102 F.T.C. at 1743
(separate statement of Commissioner Pertschuk).
116. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 697 F. Supp. at 727.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982).
118. See Russo v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 682, 684-85 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 808 F.2d 221 (2d Cir.
1986), cited in Abrams, 703 F. Supp. at 1104. See also supra note 71.
119. Charles Erwin Wilson, Testimony Before the SenateArmed Services Committee, 1952; cited
in BART.Er, FAMILtAR QUOTATtONs 817 (15th ed. 1980).
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